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Abstract. We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash
equilibria in simple stochastic multiplayer games. We show that restricting
the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may
lead to undecidability. In particular, we prove that the following problem is
undecidable: Given a game G, does there exist a pure-strategy Nash equilib-
rium of G where player 0 wins with probability 1. Moreover, this problem
remains undecidable if it is restricted to strategies with (unbounded) finite
memory. However, if mixed strategies are allowed, decidability remains
an open problem. One way to obtain a provably decidable variant of the
problem is to restrict the strategies to be positional or stationary. For the
complexity of these two problems, we obtain a common lower bound of NP
and upper bounds of NP and PSpace respectively.
1 Introduction
We study stochastic games [18] played by multiple players on a finite, directed
graph. Intuitively, a play of such a game evolves by moving a token along
edges of the graph: Each vertex of the graph is either controlled by one of
the players, or it is a stochastic vertex. Whenever the token arrives at a non-
stochastic vertex, the player who controls this vertex must move the token
to a successor vertex; when the token arrives at a stochastic vertex, a fixed
probability distribution determines the next vertex. The play ends when it
reaches a terminal vertex, in which case each player receives a payoff. In the
simplest case, which we discuss here, the possible payoffs of a single play
are just 0 and 1 (i.e. each player either wins or loses a given play). However,
due to the presence of stochastic vertices, a player’s expected payoff (i.e. her
probability of winning) can be an arbitrary probability.
Stochastic games have been successfully applied in the verification and
synthesis of reactive systems under the influence of random events. Such a
system is usually modelled as a game between the system and its environment,
where the environment’s objective is the complement of the system’s objective:
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the environment is considered hostile. Therefore, traditionally, the research
in this area has concentrated on two-player games where each play is won by
precisely one of the two players, so-called two-player, zero-sum games. However,
the system may comprise of several components with independent objectives,
a situation which is naturally modelled by a multiplayer game.
The most common interpretation of rational behaviour in multiplayer
games is captured by the notion of a Nash equilibrium [17]. In a Nash equilib-
rium, no player can improve her payoff by unilaterally switching to a different
strategy. Chatterjee & al. [6] showed that any simple stochastic multiplayer
game has a Nash equilibrium, and they also gave an algorithm for computing
one. We argue that this is not satisfactory. Indeed, it can be shown that their
algorithm may compute an equilibrium where all players lose almost surely
(i.e. receive expected payoff 0), while there exist other equilibria where all
players win almost surely (i.e. receive expected payoff 1).
In applications, one might look for an equilibrium where as many players
as possible win almost surely or where it is guaranteed that the expected
payoff of the equilibrium falls into a certain interval. Formulated as a decision
problem, we want to know, given a k-player game G with initial vertex v0 and
two thresholds x, y ∈ [0, 1]k, whether (G, v0) has a Nash equilibrium with
expected payoff at least x and at most y. This problem, which we call NE for
short, is a generalisation of Condon’s SSG Problem [8] asking whether in a
two-player, zero-sum game one of the two players, say player 0, has a strategy
to win the game with probability at least 12 .
The problem NE comes in several variants, depending on the type of
strategies one considers: On the one hand, strategies may be mixed (allowing
randomisation over actions) or pure (not allowing such randomisation). On
the other hand, one can restrict to strategies that use (unbounded or bounded)
finite memory or even to stationary ones (strategies that do not use any
memory at all). For the SSG Problem, this distinction is not meaningful
since in a two-player, zero-sum simple stochastic game both players have
an optimal positional (i.e. both pure and stationary) strategy [8]. However,
regarding NE this distinction leads to distinct decision problems, which have
to be analysed separately.
Our main result is that NE is undecidable if only pure strategies are
considered. In fact, even the following, presumably simpler, problem is
undecidable: Given a game G, decide whether there exists a pure Nash
equilibrium where player 0 wins almost surely. Moreover, the problem
remains undecidable if one restricts to pure strategies that use (unbounded)
finite memory. However, for the general case of arbitrary mixed strategies,
decidability remains an open problem.
If one restricts to simpler types of strategies like stationary ones, the
problem becomes provably decidable. In particular, for positional strategies
the problem becomes NP-complete, and for arbitrary stationary strategies the
problem is NP-hard but contained in PSpace. We also relate the complexity of
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the latter problem to the complexity of the infamous Square Root Sum Problem
(SqrtSum) by providing a polynomial-time reduction from SqrtSum to NE
with the restriction to stationary strategies. It is a long-standing open problem
whether SqrtSum falls into the polynomial hierarchy; hence, showing that
NE for stationary strategies lies inside the polynomial hierarchy would imply
a breakthrough in complexity theory.
Let us remark that our game model is rather restrictive: Firstly, players
receive a payoff only at terminal vertices. In the literature, a plethora of game
models with more complicated modes of winning have been discussed. In
particular, the model of a stochastic parity game [5, 24] has been investigated
thoroughly. Secondly, our model is turn-based (i.e. for every non-stochastic ver-
tex there is only one player who controls this vertex) as opposed to concurrent
[12, 11]. The reason that we have chosen to analyse such a restrictive model is
that we are focussing on negative results. Indeed, all our lower bounds hold
for (multiplayer versions of) the aforementioned models. Moreover, besides
Nash equilibria, our negative results apply to several other solution concepts
like subgame perfect equilibria [21, 22] and secure equilibria [4].
For games with rewards on transitions [15], the situation might be differ-
ent: While our lower bounds can be applied to games with rewards under
the average reward or the total expected reward criterion, we leave it as an open
question whether this remains true in the case of discounted rewards.
Related Work. Determining the complexity of Nash Equilibria has attracted
much interest in recent years. In particular, a series of papers culminated
in the result that computing a Nash equilibrium of a two-player game in
strategic form is complete for the complexity class PPAD [10, 7]. More in
the spirit of our work, Conitzer and Sandholm [9] showed that deciding
whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game in strategic
form where player 0 receives payoff at least x and related decision problems
are all NP-hard. For infinite games (without stochastic vertices), (a qualitative
version of) the problem NE was studied in [23]. In particular, it was shown
that the problem is NP-complete for games with parity winning conditions
and even in P for games with Büchi winning conditions.
For stochastic games, most results concern the classical SSG problem:
Condon showed that the problem is in NP∩ co-NP [8], but it is not known
to be in P. We are only aware of two results that are closely related to our
problem: Firstly, Etessami & al. [13] investigated Markov decision processes
with, e.g., multiple reachability objectives. Such a system can be viewed as a
stochastic multiplayer game where all non-stochastic vertices are controlled
by one single player. Under this interpretation, one of their results states that
NE is decidable in polynomial time for such games. Secondly, Chatterjee &
al. [6] showed that the problem of deciding whether a (concurrent) stochastic
game with reachability objectives has a positional-strategy Nash equilibrium
with payoff at least x is NP-complete. We sharpen their hardness result by
3
showing that the problem remains NP-hard when it is restricted to games with
only three players (as opposed to an unbounded number of players) where,
additionally, payoffs are assigned at terminal vertices only (cf. Theorem 5 and
the subsequent remark).
2 Simple stochastic multiplayer games
The model of a (two-player, zero-sum) simple stochastic game, introduced by Con-
don [8], easily generalises to the multiplayer case: Formally, we define a simple
stochastic multiplayer game (SSMG) as a tuple G = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π,∆, (Fi)i∈Π)
such that:
• Π is a finite set of players (usually Π = {0, 1, . . . , k− 1});
• V is a finite set of vertices;
• Vi ⊆ V and Vi ∩Vj = ∅ for each i 6= j ∈ Π;
• ∆ ⊆ V × ([0, 1] ∪ {⊥})×V is the transition relation;
• Fi ⊆ V for each i ∈ Π.
We call a vertex v ∈ Vi controlled by player i and a vertex that is not contained
in any of the sets Vi a stochastic vertex. We require that a transition is labelled
by a probability iff it originates in a stochastic vertex: If (v, p, w) ∈ ∆ then
p ∈ [0, 1] if v is a stochastic vertex and p = ⊥ if v ∈ Vi for some i ∈ Π.
Moreover, for each pair of a stochastic vertex v and an arbitrary vertex w, we
require that there exists precisely one p ∈ [0, 1] such that (v, p, w) ∈ ∆. For
computational purposes, we require additionally that all these probabilities
are rational.
For a given vertex v ∈ V, we denote the set of all w ∈ V such that there
exists p ∈ (0, 1] ∪ {⊥} with (v, p, w) ∈ ∆ by v∆. For technical reasons, we
require that v∆ 6= ∅ for all v ∈ V. Moreover, for each stochastic vertex v,
the outgoing probabilities must sum up to 1: ∑(p,w):(v,p,w)∈∆ p = 1. Finally,
we require that each vertex v that lies in one of the sets Fi is a terminal (sink)
vertex: v∆ = {v}. So if F is the set of all terminal vertices, then Fi ⊆ F for
each i ∈ Π.
A (mixed) strategy of player i in G is a mapping σ : V∗Vi → D(V) assigning
to each possible history xv ∈ V∗Vi of vertices ending in a vertex controlled by
player i a (discrete) probability distribution over V such that σ(xv)(w) > 0
only if (v,⊥, w) ∈ ∆. Instead of σ(xv)(w), we usually write σ(w | xv). A
(mixed) strategy profile of G is a tuple σ = (σi)i∈Π where σi is a strategy of
player i in G. Given a strategy profile σ = (σj)j∈Π and a strategy τ of player i,
we denote by (σ−i, τ) the strategy profile resulting from σ by replacing σi
with τ.
A strategy σ of player i is called pure if for each xv ∈ V∗Vi there exists
w ∈ v∆ with σ(w | xv) = 1. Note that a pure strategy of player i can be
identified with a function σ : V∗Vi → V. A strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈Π is
called pure if each σi is pure.
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A strategy σ of player i in G is called stationary if σ depends only on the
current vertex: σ(xv) = σ(v) for all xv ∈ V∗Vi. Hence, a stationary strategy
of player i can be identified with a function σ : Vi → D(V). A strategy profile
σ = (σi)i∈Π of G is called stationary if each σi is stationary.
We call a pure, stationary strategy a positional strategy and a strategy pro-
file consisting of positional strategies only a positional strategy profile. Clearly,
a positional strategy of player i can be identified with a function σ : Vi → V.
More generally, a pure strategy σ is called finite-state if it can be implemented
by a finite automaton with output or, equivalently, if the equivalence relation
∼ ⊆ V∗ × V∗ defined by x ∼ y if σ(xz) = σ(yz) for all z ∈ V∗Vi has only
finitely many equivalence classes.1 Finally, a finite-state strategy profile is a
profile consisting of finite-state strategies only.
It is sometimes convenient to designate an initial vertex v0 ∈ V of the
game. We call the tuple (G, v0) an initialised SSMG. A strategy (strategy
profile) of (G, v0) is just a strategy (strategy profile) of G. In the following, we
will use the abbreviation SSMG also for initialised SSMGs. It should always
be clear from the context if the game is initialised or not.
Given an SSMG (G, v0) and a strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈Π , the conditional
probability of w ∈ V given the history xv ∈ V∗V is the number σi(w | xv) if
v ∈ Vi and the unique p ∈ [0, 1] such that (v, p, w) ∈ ∆ if v is a stochastic
vertex. We abuse notation and denote this probability by σ(w | xv). The
probabilities σ(w | xv) induce a probability measure on the space Vω in
the following way: The probability of a basic open set v1 . . . vk · Vω is 0 if
v1 6= v0 and the product of the probabilities σ(vj | v1 . . . vj−1) for j = 2, . . . , k
otherwise. It is a classical result of measure theory that this extends to a
unique probability measure assigning a probability to every Borel subset of
Vω, which we denote by Prσv0 .
For a set U ⊆ V, let Reach(U) := V∗ ·U ·Vω. We are mainly interested
in the probabilities pi := Prσv0(Reach(Fi)) of reaching the sets Fi. We call pi
the (expected) payoff of σ for player i and the vector (pi)i∈Π the (expected) payoff
of σ. Another way to define these probabilities is via the Markov chain Gσ
which is defined as follows: The state set of Gσ is V+ (the set of all nonempty
sequences of vertices), and the probability of going from state xv to state xvw
(x ∈ V∗, v, w ∈ V) is equal to σ(w | xv). Then the expected payoff of σ for
player i can be computed as the probability of reaching a state xv with v ∈ Fi
from state v0 in Gσ.
Drawing an SSMG. When drawing an SSMG as a graph, we will use the
following conventions: The initial vertex is marked by an incoming edge that
has no source vertex. Vertices that are controlled by a player are depicted
as circles, where the player who controls a vertex is given by the label
next to it. Stochastic vertices are depicted as diamonds, where the transition
1In general, this definition is applicable to mixed strategies as well, but for this paper we
will identify finite-state strategies with pure finite-state strategies.
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probabilities are given by the labels on its outgoing edges (the default being 12 ).
Finally, terminal vertices are generally represented by their associated payoff
vector. In fact, we allow arbitrary vectors of rational probabilities as payoffs.
This does not increase the power of the model since such a payoff vector can
easily be realised by an SSMG consisting of stochastic and terminal vertices
only.
3 Nash equilibria
To capture rational behaviour of (selfish) players, John Nash [17] introduced
the notion of, what is now called, a Nash equilibrium. Formally, given a strategy
profile σ, a strategy τ of player i is called a best response to σ if τ maximises the
expected payoff of player i: Pr(σ−i ,τ
′)
v0 (Reach(Fi)) ≤ Pr(σ−i ,τ)v0 (Reach(Fi)) for all
strategies τ′ of player i. A Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈Π
such that each σi is a best response to σ. Hence, in a Nash equilibrium
no player can improve her payoff by (unilaterally) switching to a different
strategy.
Previous research on algorithms for finding Nash equilibria in infinite
games has focused on computing some Nash equilibrium [6]. However, a
game may have several Nash equilibria with different payoffs, and one might
not be interested in any Nash equilibrium but in one whose payoff fulfils
certain requirements. For example, one might look for a Nash equilibrium
where certain players win almost surely while certain others lose almost
surely. This idea leads us to the following decision problem, which we call
NE:2
Given an SSMG (G, v0) and thresholds x, y ∈ [0, 1]Π , decide whether
there exists a Nash equilibrium of (G, v0) with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y.
For computational purposes, we assume that the thresholds x and y are
vectors of rational numbers. A variant of the problem which omits the
thresholds just asks about a Nash equilibrium where some distinguished
player, say player 0, wins with probability 1:
Given an SSMG (G, v0), decide whether there exists a Nash equilib-
rium of (G, v0) where player 0 wins almost surely.
Clearly, every instance of the threshold-free variant can easily be turned
into an instance of NE (by adding the thresholds x = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and y =
(1, . . . , 1)). Hence, NE is, a priori, more general than its threshold-free variant.
Our main concern in this paper are variants of NE where we restrict
the type of strategies that are allowed in the definition of the problem: Let
PureNE, FinNE, StatNE and PosNE be the problems that arise from NE by
restricting the desired Nash equilibrium to consist of pure strategies, finite-
state strategies, stationary strategies and positional strategies, respectively.
2In the definition of NE, the ordering ≤ is applied componentwise.
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In the rest of this paper, we are going to prove upper and lower bounds
on the complexity of these problems, where all lower bounds hold for the
threshold-free variants, too.
Our first observation is that neither stationary nor pure strategies are
sufficient to implement any Nash equilibrium, even if we are only interested
in whether a player wins or loses almost surely in the Nash equilibrium. To-
gether with a result from Section 5 (namely Proposition 10), this demonstrates
that the problems NE, PureNE, FinNE, StatNE, and PosNE are pairwise
distinct problems, which have to be analysed separately.
Proposition 1. There exists an SSMG that has a finite-state Nash equilibrium
where player 0 wins almost surely but that has no stationary Nash equilibrium
where player 0 wins with positive probability.
Proof. Consider the game G depicted in Figure 1 played by three players 0,
1 and 2 (with payoffs in this order). Obviously, the following finite-state
strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium where player 0 wins almost surely:
Player 1 plays from vertex v2 to vertex v3 at the first visit of v2 but leaves
the game immediately (by playing to the neighbouring terminal vertex) at all
subsequent visits to v2; from vertex v0 player 1 plays to v1; player 2 plays from
vertex v3 to vertex v4 at the first visit of v3 but leaves the game immediately
at all subsequent visits to v3; from vertex v1 player 2 plays to v2.
v0
1
(0, 12 , 0)
v1
2
(0, 0, 12 )
v2
1
(1, 0, 1)
v32
(0, 0, 0)
v4 (1, 1, 0)
Figure 1. An SSMG with three players
It remains to show that there is no stationary Nash equilibrium of (G, v0)
where player 0 wins with positive probability. Any stationary Nash equi-
librium of (G, v0) where player 0 wins with positive probability induces a
stationary Nash equilibrium of (G, v2) where both players 1 and 2 receive pay-
off at least 12 since otherwise one of these players could improve her payoff by
changing her strategy at v0 or v1. Hence, it suffices to show that (G, v2) has no
stationary Nash equilibrium where both players 1 and 2 receive payoff at least
1
2 . Assume there exists such an equilibrium and denote by p the probability
that player 2 plays from v3 to v4. Since player 1 wins with probability > 0, it
must be the case that p > 0. But then, to have a Nash equilibrium, player 1
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must play from v2 to v3 with probability 1, giving player 2 a payoff of 0, a
contradiction. q.e.d.
Proposition 2. There exists an SSMG that has a stationary Nash equilibrium
where player 0 wins almost surely but that has no pure Nash equilibrium
where player 0 wins with positive probability.
Proof. Consider the game depicted in Figure 2 played by three players 0, 1
and 2 (with payoffs given in this order). Clearly, the stationary strategy profile
where from vertex v2 player 0 selects both outgoing edges with probability 12
each, player 1 plays from v0 to v1 and player 2 plays from v1 to v2 is a
Nash equilibrium where player 0 wins almost surely. However, for any pure
strategy profile where player 0 wins almost surely, either player 1 or player 2
receives payoff 0 and could improve her payoff by switching her strategy at
v0 or v1 respectively. q.e.d.
v0
1
v1
2
v2
0
(1, 1, 0)
(1, 0, 1)
(0, 12 , 0) (0, 0,
1
2 )
Figure 2. Another SSMG with three players
4 Decidable variants of NE
4.1 Upper bounds
In this section, we show that the problems PosNE and StatNE are contained
in the complexity classes NP and PSpace respectively.
Theorem 3. PosNE is in NP.
Proof. Let (G, v0) be an SSMG. Any positional strategy profile of G can be
identified with a mapping σ :
⋃
i∈Π Vi → V such that (v,⊥, σ(v)) ∈ ∆ for
each non-stochastic vertex v, an object whose size is linear in the size of G. To
prove that PosNE is in NP, it suffices to show that we can check in polynomial
time whether such a mapping σ constitutes a Nash equilibrium whose payoff
lies in between the given thresholds x and y.
First, we need to compute the payoff of σ. Let ziv := Pr
σ
v (Reach(Fi))
denote the expected payoff of σ for player i in (G, v), and let zi = (ziv)v∈V . It
is a well-known result of the theory of Markov chains that zi is the optimal
solution of the following linear programme:
Minimise ∑v∈V ziv, subject to:
ziv ≥ 0 for v ∈ V,
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ziv = 1 for v ∈ Fi,
ziv = ∑
w∈V
σ(w | v) · ziw for v ∈ V \ Fi.
Once we have computed zi, we can check whether xi ≤ ziv0 ≤ yi; this
inequality holds for each player i ∈ Π iff the payoff of σ lies in between x
and y.
To check whether σ is a Nash equilibrium, we need to compute the
numbers supτ Pr
(σ−i ,τ)
v0 (Reach(Fi)) (where τ ranges over every strategy of
player i in G), the maximal payoff that player i can achieve when playing
against σ−i. If this payoff is equal to ziv0 , then she cannot gain anything
by unilaterally switching to any other strategy. From the theory of Markov
decision process (cf. [19]), it is well-known that the desired payoff can be
computed by the following linear programme over the variables ri = (riv)v∈V :
Minimise ∑v∈V riv, subject to:
riv ≥ 0 for v ∈ V,
riv = 1 for v ∈ Fi,
riv ≥ riw for v ∈ Vi and w ∈ v∆,
riv = ∑
w∈V
σ(w | v) · riw for v ∈ V \Vi.
To check whether σ is a Nash equilibrium, it suffices to compute for each
player i the optimal solution ri and to check whether riv0 = z
i
v0 .
Since linear programmes can be solved in polynomial time and both
programmes are of size polynomial in the size of the game, all these checks
can be carried out in polynomial time. q.e.d.
To prove the decidability of StatNE, we appeal to results established for
the Existential Theory of the Reals, ExTh(R), the set of all existential first-order
sentences (over the appropriate signature) that hold in R := (R,+, ·, 0, 1,≤).
The best known upper bound for the complexity of the associated decision
problem is PSpace [3, 20], which leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 4. StatNE is in PSpace.
Proof. Instead of giving a deterministic polynomial-space algorithm for
StatNE, we give a nondeterministic one. Since PSpace = NPSpace, this
implies that StatNE is in PSpace. On input G, v0, x, y, the algorithm starts by
guessing a set S ⊆ V×V and proceeds by computing, for each player i, the set
Ri of vertices from where the set Fi is reachable in the graph G = (V, S), a com-
putation which can be carried out in polynomial time. Note that if S is the sup-
port of a stationary strategy profile σ, i.e. S = {(v, w) ∈ V×V : σ(w | v) > 0},
then Ri is precisely the set of vertices v such that Prσv (Reach(Fi)) > 0. Finally,
the algorithm evaluates an existential first-order sentence ψ, which can be
computed in polynomial time from (G, v0), x, y, S and (Ri)i∈Π, over R and
returns the answer to this query.
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It remains to describe a suitable sentence ψ. Let α = (αvw)v,w∈V , r =
(riv)i∈Π,v∈V and z = (ziv)i∈Π,v∈V be three sets of variables, and let V∗ =⋃
i∈Π Vi be the set of all non-stochastic vertices. The formula
ϕ(α) :=
∧
v∈V∗
( ∧
w∈v∆
αvw ≥ 0 ∧
∧
w∈V\v∆
αvw = 0∧ ∑
w∈v∆
αvw = 1
)
∧
∧
v∈V\V∗
w∈V
αvw = pvw ∧
∧
(v,w)∈S
αvw > 0∧
∧
(v,w) 6∈S
αvw = 0 ,
where pvw is the unique number such that (v, pvw, w) ∈ ∆, states that the
mapping σ : V → D(V) defined by σ(w | v) = αvw constitutes a valid
stationary strategy profile of G whose support is S. Provided that ϕ(α) holds
in R, the formula
ηi(α, z) :=
∧
v∈Fi
ziv = 1∧
∧
v∈V\Ri
ziv = 0∧
∧
v∈V\Fi
ziv = ∑
w∈v∆
αvwziw
states that ziv = Pr
σ
v (Reach(Fi)) for each v ∈ V, where σ is defined as above.
Again, this follows from a well-known results about Markov chains, namely
that the vector of the aforementioned probabilities is the unique solution to
the given system of equations. Finally, the formula
ϑi(α, r) :=
∧
v∈V
riv ≥ 0∧
∧
v∈Fi
riv = 1∧
∧
v∈Vi
w∈v∆
riv ≥ riw ∧
∧
v∈V\Vi
riv = ∑
w∈v∆
αvwriw
states that r is a solution of the linear programme for computing the maximal
payoff that player i can achieve when playing against the strategy profile σ−i.
In particular, the formula is fulfilled if riv = supτ Pr
(σ−i ,τ)
v (Reach(Fi)) (where
τ ranges over every strategy of player i), and every other solution is greater
than this one (in each component).
The desired sentence ψ is the existential closure of the conjunction of
ϕ and, for each player i, the formulae ηi and ϑi combined with formulae
stating that player i cannot improve her payoff and that the expected payoff
for player i lies in between the given thresholds:
ψ := ∃α ∃r ∃z (ϕ(α) ∧ ∧
i∈Π
(ηi(α, z) ∧ ϑi(α, r) ∧ riv0 ≤ ziv0 ∧ xi ≤ ziv0 ≤ yi)
)
It follows that ψ holds in R iff (G, v0) has a stationary Nash equilibrium σ
with payoff at least x and at most y whose support is S. Consequently, the
algorithm is correct. q.e.d.
4.2 Lower bounds
Having shown that PosNE and StatNE are in NP and PSpace respectively,
the natural question arises whether there is a polynomial-time algorithm
for PosNE or StatNE. The following theorem shows that this is not the case
(unless, of course, P = NP) since both problems are NP-hard. Moreover, both
problems are already NP-hard for games with only two players.
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Theorem 5. PosNE and StatNE are NP-hard, even for games with only two
players.
Proof. The proof is by reduction from SAT. Let ϕ = C1 ∧ · · · ∧Cm be a formula
in conjunctive normal form over propositional variables X1, . . . , Xn. Our aim
is to construct a two-player SSMG (Gϕ, v0) such that the following statements
are equivalent:
1. ϕ is satisfiable;
2. (Gϕ, v0) has a positional Nash equilibrium with payoff (1, 12 );
3. (Gϕ, v0) has a stationary Nash equilibrium with payoff (1, 12 ).
Provided that the game can be constructed in polynomial time, the equiva-
lence of 1. and 2. establishes a polynomial-time reduction from SAT to PosNE,
whereas the equivalence of 1. and 3. establishes one from SAT to StatNE. The
game Gϕ is depicted in Figure 3 and played by players 0 and 1. The game
proceeds from the initial vertex v0 to Xi or Xi with probability 12i+1 each, and
there is an edge from vertex Cj to vertex Xi or Xi iff Xi or ¬Xi respectively
occurs in the clause Cj. Also, from >-labelled vertices player 1 can “leave the
game” by moving to a terminal vertex with payoff (0, 1). Obviously, the game
Gϕ can be constructed from ϕ in polynomial time. It remains to show that
1.–3. are equivalent.
(1. ⇒ 2.) Assume that α : {X1, . . . , Xn} → {true, false} is a satisfying
assignment of ϕ. In the positional Nash equilibrium of (G, v0), player 0 moves
from a literal L (i.e. L = Xi or L = Xi for some i = 1, . . . , n) to the >-labelled
vertex iff L is mapped to true by α, and player 1 moves from vertex Cj to a
(fixed) literal L that is contained in Cj and mapped to true by α (which is
possible since α is a satisfying assignment). At >-labelled vertices, player 1
never leaves the game. Obviously, player 0 wins almost surely with this
strategy profile. For player 1, the payoff is
1
2n+1
+
n
∑
i=1
1
2i+1
=
1
2n+1
+
1
2
( n
∑
i=1
1
2i
)
=
1
2n+1
+
1
2
(
1− 1
2n
)
=
1
2
,
where the first summand is the probability of going from the initial vertex to
ϕ, from where player 1 wins almost surely since from every clause vertex she
plays to a “true” literal. Obviously, changing her strategy cannot give her a
better payoff. Therefore, we have a Nash equilibrium.
(2.⇒ 3.) Obvious.
(3. ⇒ 1.) Let σ = (σ0, σ1) be a stationary Nash equilibrium of (Gϕ, v0)
with payoff (1, 12 ). Our first aim is to show that σ0 is actually a positional
strategy. Towards a contradiction, assume that there exists a literal L such
that σ0(L) assigns probability 0 < q < 1 to the neighbouring >-labelled
vertex. Since player 0 wins almost surely, player 1 never leaves the game.
Hence, the expected payoff for player 1 from vertex L (i.e. in the game (Gϕ, L))
is precisely q. However, if she left the game at the >-labelled vertex, she
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Figure 3. Reducing SAT to PosNE and StatNE.
would receive payoff 2q1+q > q. Therefore, σ is not a Nash equilibrium, a
contradiction.
Knowing that σ0 is a positional strategy, we can define a pseudo assignment
α : {X1,¬X1, . . . , Xn,¬Xn} → {true, false} by setting α(L) = true if σ1 pre-
scribes to go from vertex L to the neighbouring >-labelled vertex. Our next
aim is to show that α is actually an assignment: α(Xi) = true ⇔ α(¬Xi) =
false. To see this, note that we can compute player 1’s expected payoff as
follows:
1
2
=
p
2n+1
+
n
∑
i=1
ai
2i+1
, ai =

0 if α(Xi) = α(¬Xi) = false,
1 if α(Xi) 6= α(¬Xi),
2 if α(Xi) = α(¬Xi) = true,
where p is the expected payoff for player 1 from vertex ϕ. By the construction
12
of Gϕ, we have p > 0, and the equality only holds if p = 1 and ai = 1 for all
i = 1, . . . , n, which proves that α is an assignment.
Finally, we claim that α is a satisfying assignment. If this were not the
case, there would exist a clause C such that player 1’s expected payoff from
vertex C is 0 and therefore p < 1, where p is defined as above. This is a
contradiction to the fact that p = 1, as we have shown above. q.e.d.
Remark. The reduction in the proof of Theorem 5 can be modified to demon-
strate NP-hardness of the threshold-free variants of PosNE and StatNE, albeit
at the expense of adding one more player to the game.
It follows from Theorems 3 and 5 that PosNE is NP-complete. For StatNE,
we have provided an NP lower bound and a PSpace upper bound, but the
exact complexity of the problem remains unclear. Towards gaining more
insight into the problem StatNE, we relate its complexity to the complexity
of the Square Root Sum Problem (SqrtSum), the problem of deciding, given
numbers d1, . . . , dn, k ∈N, whether ∑ni=1
√
di ≥ k. Recently, it was shown that
SqrtSum belongs to the 4th level of the counting hierarchy [1], which is a slight
improvement over the previously known PSpace upper bound. However, it is
an open question since the 1970s whether SqrtSum falls into the polynomial
hierarchy [16, 14]. We identify a polynomial-time reduction from SqrtSum
to StatNE.3 Hence, StatNE is at least as hard as SqrtSum, and showing
that StatNE resides inside the polynomial hierarchy would imply a major
breakthrough in understanding the complexity of numerical computation.
Theorem 6. SqrtSum is polynomial-time reducible to StatNE.
Proof. Given an instance (d1, . . . , dn, k) of SqrtSum, we construct an
SSMG (G, v0) played by players 0, 1, 2, 3 (with payoffs given in this order)
such that ∑ni=1
√
di ≥ k iff (G, v0) has a stationary Nash equilibrium where
player 0 wins almost surely.
In order to state our reduction, let us first examine the game G(p), where
p ∈ [ 12 , 1), which is depicted in Figure 4 (b).
Claim 7. The maximal payoff player 3 can receive in a stationary Nash equi-
librium of (G(p), s) is
√
2−2p−p+1
2p+2 .
Proof. Let σ be any stationary strategy profile of (G(p), s). We denote by x1
and x2 the probabilities that player 0 stays inside the gadget at vertex s1 and
vertex s2 respectively. Consequently, the probabilities of eventually leaving
the gadget at vertex s1 and vertex s2 are given by p1(x1, x2) :=
p(1−x1)
1−x1x2 p2 and
p2(x1, x2) :=
p(1−x2)
1−x1x2 p2 respectively. Note that if x1 = 0, then σ is a Nash
equilibrium where player 3 receives payoff ≤ 1− p ≤
√
2−2p−p+1
2p+2 . Hence, let
us assume that x1 > 0 and look for a Nash equilibrium where player 3 receives
3Some authors define SqrtSum with ≤ instead of ≥. With this definition, we would reduce
from the complement of SqrtSum instead.
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Figure 4. Reducing SqrtSum to StatNE.
payoff > 1− p. For this, it must be the case that p1(x1, x2), p2(x1, x2) ≥ 12
since otherwise player 1 or player 2 could improve her payoff by moving
out of the gadget, where they would get payoff 12 immediately (and player 3
would receive payoff ≤ 1− p). Vice versa, if p1(x1, x2), p2(x1, x2) ≥ 12 then σ
is obviously a Nash equilibrium. Hence, to determine the maximum payoff for
player 3 in a stationary Nash equilibrium, we have to maximise 1−p1−x1x2 p2 , the
expected payoff for player 3, under the constraints p1(x1, x2), p2(x1, x2) ≥ 12
and 0 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 1. We claim that the maximum is reached only if x1 = x2;
if, for example, x1 > x2 then we can achieve a higher payoff for player 3 by
setting x′2 := x1, and the constraints are still satisfied:
p(1− x′2)
1− x1x′2 p2
=
p(1− x1)
1− x1x′2 p2
=
p(1− x1)
1− x21 p2
≥ p(1− x1)
1− x1x2 p2 ≥
1
2
Hence, in fact, we have to maximise 1−p1−x2 p2 under the constraints
p(1−x)
1−x2 p2 ≥ 12
and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, i.e. under p2x2 − 2px + 2p− 1 ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. The roots
of p2x2 − 2px + 2p− 1 are 1±
√
2−2p
p , but
1+
√
2−2p
p is always greater than 1
for p ∈ [0, 1). Hence, any solution must be less than x := 1−
√
2−2p
p . In fact,
we always have 0 ≤ x < 1 for p ∈ ( 12 , 1). Therefore, x is the optimal solution,
and the maximal payoff for player 3 is indeed 1−p1−x2 p2 =
√
2−2p−p+1
2p+2 .
Finally, we can setup our reduction. Let (d1, . . . , dn, k) be an instance of
SqrtSum where, without loss of generality, n > 0, di > 0 for each i = 1, . . . , n,
and k ≤ d := ∑ni=1 di. Define pi := 1 − di2d2 for i = 1, . . . , n. Note that
pi ∈ [ 12 , 1) since 0 < di ≤ d ≤ d2. For the reduction, we use n copies of the
game G(p), where in the ith copy we set p to pi. The complete game G is
depicted in Figure 4 (a); it can obviously be constructed in polynomial time.
By the above claim, the maximal payoff player 3 can get in a stationary
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Nash equilibrium of (G(pi), s) is√
2− 2pi − pi + 1
2pi + 2
=
1
d
√
di − (1− di2d2 ) + 1
4− did2
=
d
√
di +
di
2
4d2 − di .
Consequently, the maximal payoff player 3 can get in a stationary Nash
equilibrium of (G, v1) is
n
∑
i=1
4d2 − di
4d2n
· d
√
di +
di
2
4d2 − di =
n
∑
i=1
√
di
4dn
+
n
∑
i=1
di
8d2n
=
n
∑
i=1
√
di
4dn
+
1
8dn
.
Let us fix a stationary Nash equilibrium σ of (G, v1) with this payoff for
player 3.
Now, if ∑ni=1
√
di ≥ k, then also ∑ni=1
√
di
4dn +
1
8dn ≥ 2k+18dn , and σ can be
extended to a stationary Nash equilibrium of (G, v0) where player 0 wins
almost surely by setting σ(v1 | v0) = 1. On the other hand, if ∑ni=1
√
di < k,
then also ∑ni=1
√
di
4dn +
1
8dn <
2k+1
8dn , and in every stationary Nash equilibrium of
(G, v0) player 3 leaves the game at v0, which gives payoff 0 to player 0. q.e.d.
5 Undecidable variants of NE
5.1 Pure-strategy equilibria
In this section, we show that the problem PureNE is undecidable by exhibiting
a reduction from an undecidable problem about two-counter machines. Our
construction is inspired by a construction used by Brázdil & al. [2] to prove the
undecidability of stochastic games with branching-time winning conditions.
A two-counter machine M is given by a list of instructions ι1, . . . , ιm
where each instruction is one of the following:
• “inc(j); goto k” (increment counter j by 1 and go to instruction num-
ber k);
• “zero(j) ? goto k : dec(j); goto l” (if the value of counter j is zero, go to
instruction number k; otherwise, decrement counter j by one and go to
instruction number l);
• “halt” (stop the computation).
Here j ranges over 1, 2 (the two counters), and k 6= l range over 1, . . . , m. A
configuration ofM is a triple C = (i, c1, c2) ∈ {1, . . . , m} ×N×N, where i
denotes the number of the current instruction and cj denotes the current value
of counter j. A configuration C′ is the successor of configuration C, denoted
by C ` C′, if it results from C by executing instruction ιi; a configuration
C = (i, c1, c2) with ιi = “halt” has no successor configuration. Finally, the
computation ofM is the unique maximal sequence ρ = ρ(0)ρ(1) . . . such that
ρ(0) ` ρ(1) ` . . . and ρ(0) = (1, 0, 0) (the initial configuration). Note that ρ is
either infinite, or it ends in a configuration C = (i, c1, c2) such that ιi = “halt”.
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The halting problem is to decide, given a machineM, whether the compu-
tation ofM is finite. It is well-known that two-counter machines are Turing
powerful, which makes the halting problem and its dual, the non-halting
problem, undecidable.
Theorem 8. PureNE is undecidable.
In order to prove Theorem 8, we show that one can compute from a
two-counter machine M an SSMG (G, v0) with nine players such that the
computation ofM is infinite iff (G, v0) has a pure Nash equilibrium where
player 0 wins almost surely. This establishes a reduction from the non-halting
problem to PureNE.
The game G is played player 0 and eight other players Atj and Btj , indexed
by j ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ {0, 1}. Let Γ = {init, inc(j), dec(j), zero(j) : j = 1, 2}. If
M has instructions ι1, . . . , ιm, then for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, each γ ∈ Γ, each
j ∈ {1, 2} and each t ∈ {0, 1}, the game G contains the gadgets Sti,γ, Iti,γ and
Ctj,γ, which are depicted in Figure 5. In the figure, squares represent terminal
vertices (the edge leading from a terminal vertex to itself being implicit), and
the labelling indicates which players win at the respective vertex. Moreover,
the dashed edge inside Ctj,γ is present iff γ 6∈ {init, zero(j)}. The initial
vertex v0 of G is the black vertex inside the gadget S01,init.
For any pure strategy profile σ of G where player 0 wins almost surely, let
x0v0 ≺ x1v1 ≺ x2v2 ≺ . . . (xi ∈ V∗, v ∈ V, x0 = ε) be the (unique) sequence
of all consecutive histories such that, for each n ∈ N, vn is a black vertex
and Prσv0(xnvn · Vω) > 0. Additionally, let γ0,γ1, . . . be the corresponding
sequence of instructions, i.e. γn = γ for the unique instruction γ such that vn
lies in one of the gadgets Sti,γ (where t = n mod 2). For each j ∈ {1, 2} and
n ∈N, we define two conditional probabilities anj and pnj as follows:
anj := Pr
σ
v0(Reach(FAn mod 2j
) | xnvn ·Vω)
and
pnj := Pr
σ
v0(Reach(FAn mod 2j
) | xnvn ·Vω \ xn+2vn+2 ·Vω).
Finally, for each j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈N, we define an ordinal number cnj ≤ ω
as follows: After the history xnvn, with probability 18 the play proceeds to the
vertex controlled by player 0 in the counter gadget Ctj,γn (where t = n mod 2).
The number cnj is defined to be the maximal number of subsequent visits to
the grey vertex inside this gadget (where cnj = ω if, on one path, the grey
vertex is visited infinitely often). Note that, by the construction of Ctj,γ, it
holds that cnj = 0 if γn = zero(j) or γn = init.
Lemma 9. Let σ be a pure strategy profile of (G, v0) where player 0 wins
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Figure 5. Simulating a two-counter machine.
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almost surely. Then σ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if
cn+1j =

1+ cnj if γn+1 = inc(j),
cnj − 1 if γn+1 = dec(j),
cnj = 0 if γn+1 = zero(j),
cnj otherwise
(1)
for all j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈N.
Here + and − denote the usual addition and subtraction of ordinal
numbers respectively (satisfying 1+ω = ω− 1 = ω). The proof of Lemma 9
goes through several claims. In the following, let σ be a pure strategy profile
of (G, v0) where player 0 wins almost surely. The first claim gives a necessary
and sufficient condition on the probabilities anj for σ to be a Nash equilibrium.
Claim. The profile σ is a Nash equilibrium iff anj =
1
3 for all j ∈ {1, 2} and
n ∈N.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that σ is a Nash equilibrium. Clearly, this implies that
anj ≥ 13 for all n ∈ N since otherwise some player Atj could improve her
payoff by leaving one of the gadgets Sti,γ. Let
bnj := Pr
σ
v0(Reach(FBn mod 2j
) | xnvn ·Vω).
We have bnj ≥ 16 for all n ∈N since otherwise some player Btj could improve
her payoff by leaving one of the gadgets Sti,γ. Note that at every terminal
vertex of the counter gadgets Ctj,γ and C
t
j,γ either player A
t
j or player B
t
j wins.
The conditional probability that, given the history xnvn, we reach one of those
gadgets is ∑k∈N 12k · 14 = 12 for all n ∈ N, so we have anj = 12 − bnj for all
n ∈N. Since bnj ≥ 16 , we arrive at anj ≤ 12 − 16 = 13 , which proves the claim.
(⇐) Assume that anj = 13 for all n ∈N. Clearly, this implies that none of
the players Atj can improve her payoff. To show that none of the players B
t
j
can improve her payoff, it suffices to show that bnj ≥ 16 for all n ∈ N. But
with the same argumentation as above, we have bnj =
1
2 − anj and thus bnj = 16
for all n ∈N, which proves the claim. q.e.d.
The second claim relates the probabilities anj and p
n
j .
Claim. Let j ∈ {1, 2}. Then anj = 13 for all n ∈N if and only if pnj = 14 for all
n ∈N.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that anj = 13 for all n ∈ N. We have anj = pnj + 14 · an+2j
and therefore 13 = p
n
j +
1
12 for all n ∈N. Hence, pnj = 14 for all n ∈N.
(⇐) Assume that pnj = 14 for all n ∈ N. Since anj = pnj + 14 · an+2j for all
n ∈N, the numbers anj must satisfy the following recurrence: an+2j = 4anj − 1.
Since all the numbers anj are probabilities, we have 0 ≤ anj ≤ 1 for all n ∈N.
It is easy to see that the only values for a0j and a
1
j such that 0 ≤ anj ≤ 1 for all
n ∈N are a0j = a1j = 13 . But this implies that anj = 13 for all n ∈N. q.e.d.
18
Finally, the last claim relates the numbers pnj to (1).
Claim. Let j ∈ {1, 2}. Then pnj = 14 for all n ∈ N if and only if (1) holds for
all n ∈N.
Proof. Let n ∈ N, and let t = n mod 2. The probability pnj can be expressed
as the sum of the probability that the play reaches a terminal vertex that is
winning for player Atj inside C
t
j,γn and the probability that the play reaches
such a vertex inside Ctj,γn+1 . The first probability does not depend on γn, but
the second depends on γn+1. Let us consider the case that γn+1 = inc(j). In
this case, the aforementioned sum is equal to the following sum of two binary
numbers:
0.00 1 . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
cnj times
111+ 0.000 0 . . . 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
cn+1j times
100 .
Obviously, this sum is equal to 14 iff c
n+1
j = 1 + c
n
j . For any other value of
γn+1, the argumentation is similar, and we omit it here. q.e.d.
Proof of Lemma 9. By the first claim, the profile σ is a Nash equilibrium iff
anj =
1
3 for all j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈N. By the second claim, the latter is true if
pnj =
1
4 for all j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈N. Finally, by the last claim, this is the case
iff (1) holds for all j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈N. q.e.d.
To establish the reduction, it remains to show that the computation of
M is infinite iff the game (G, v0) has a pure Nash equilibrium where player 0
wins almost surely.
(⇒) Assume that the computation ρ = ρ(0)ρ(1) . . . ofM is infinite. We
define a pure strategy σ0 for player 0 as follows: For a history that ends in
one of the instruction gadgets Iti,γ after visiting a black vertex exactly n times,
player 0 tries to move to the neighbouring gadget Stk,γ′ such that ρ(n) refers to
instruction number k (which is always possible if ρ(n− 1) refers to instruction
number i; in any other case, σ0 might be defined arbitrarily). In particular,
if ρ(n − 1) refers to instruction ιi = “zero(j) ? goto k : dec(j); goto l”, then
player 0 will move to the gadget Stk,zero(j) if the value of the counter in
configuration ρ(n− 1) is 0 and to the gadget Stl,dec(j) otherwise. For a history
that ends in one of the gadgets Ctj,γ after visiting a black vertex exactly n times
and a grey vertex exactly m times, player 0 will move to the grey vertex again
iff m is strictly less than the value of the counter j in configuration ρ(n− 1). So
after entering Ctj,γ, player 0’s strategy is to loop through the grey vertex exactly
as many times as given by the value of the counter j in configuration ρ(n− 1).
Any other player’s pure strategy is “moving down at any time”. We
claim that the resulting strategy profile σ is a Nash equilibrium of (G, v0)
where player 0 wins almost surely.
Since, according to her strategy, player 0 follows the computation ofM,
no vertex inside an instruction gadget Iti,γ where ιi is the halt instruction
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is ever reached. Hence, with probability 1 a terminal vertex in one of the
counter gadgets is reached. Since player 0 wins at any such vertex, we can
conclude that she wins almost surely.
It remains to show that σ is a Nash equilibrium. By the definition of
player 0’s strategy σ0, we have the following for all n ∈ N: 1. cnj is the
value of counter j in configuration ρ(n); 2. cn+1j is the value of counter j in
configuration ρ(n+ 1); 3. γn+1 is the instruction corresponding to the counter
update from configuration ρ(n) to ρ(n+ 1). Hence, (1) holds, and σ is a Nash
equilibrium by Lemma 9.
(⇐) Assume that σ is a pure Nash equilibrium of (G, v0) where player 0
wins almost surely. We define an infinite sequence ρ = ρ(0)ρ(1) . . . of pseudo
configurations (where the counters may take the value ω) ofM as follows. Let
n ∈N, and assume that vn lies inside the gadget Sti,γn (where t = n mod 2);
then ρ(n) := (i, cn1 , c
n
2 ).
We claim that ρ is, in fact, the (infinite) computation ofM. It suffices to
verify the following two properties:
1. ρ(0) = (1, 0, 0);
2. ρ(n) ` ρ(n + 1) for all n ∈N.
Note that we do not have to show explicitly that each ρ(n) is a configuration
ofM since this follows easily by induction from 1. and 2. Verifying the first
property is easy: v0 lies inside S01,init (and we are at instruction 1), which is
linked to the counter gadgets C01,init and C
0
2,init. The edge leading to the grey
vertex is missing in these gadgets. Hence, c01 and c
0
2 are both equal to 0.
For the second property, let ρ(n) = (i, c1, c2) and ρ(n + 1) =
(i′, c′1, c
′
2). Hence, vn lies inside S
t
i,γ and vn+1 inside S
t
i′ ,γ′ for suitable
γ,γ′ and t = n mod 2. We only proof the claim for the case that ιi =
“zero(2) ? goto k : dec(2); goto l”; the other cases are straightforward. Note
that, by the construction of the gadget Iti,γ, it must be the case that either i
′ = k
and γ′ = zero(2), or i′ = l and γ′ = dec(2). By Lemma 9, if γ′ = zero(2),
then c′2 = c2 = 0 and c′1 = c1, and if γ
′ = dec(2), then c′2 = c2− 1 and c′1 = c1.
This implies ρ(n) ` ρ(n + 1): On the one hand, if c2 = 0, then c′2 6= c2 − 1,
which implies γ′ 6= dec(2) and thus γ′ = zero(2), i′ = k and c′2 = c2 = 0. On
the other hand, if c2 > 0, then γ′ 6= zero(2) and thus γ′ = dec(2), i′ = l and
c′2 = c2 − 1. q.e.d.
5.2 Finite-state equilibria
It follows from the proof of Theorem 8 that Nash equilibria may require
infinite memory (even if we are only interested in whether a player wins with
probability 0 or 1). More precisely, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 10. There exists an SSMG that has a pure Nash equilibrium
where player 0 wins almost surely but that has no finite-state Nash equilib-
rium where player 0 wins with positive probability.
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Proof. Consider the game (G, v0) constructed in the proof of Theorem 8 for the
machineM consisting of the single instruction “inc(1); goto 1”. We modify
this game by adding a new initial vertex v1 which is controlled by a new
player, player 1, and from where she can either move to v0 or to a new
terminal vertex where she receives payoff 1 and every other player receives
payoff 0. Additionally, player 1 wins at every terminal vertex of the game G
that is winning for player 0. Let us denote the modified game by G ′.
Since the computation ofM is infinite, the game (G, v0) has a pure Nash
equilibrium where player 0 wins almost surely. This equilibrium induces a
pure Nash equilibrium of (G ′, v1) where player 0 wins almost surely.
Now assume that there exists a finite-state Nash equilibrium of (G ′, v1)
where player 0 wins with positive probability. Such an equilibrium induces a
finite-state Nash equilibrium of (G, v0) where player 1, and thus also player 0,
wins almost surely since otherwise player 1 would play to v0 with probabil-
ity 1. By Lemma 9, this implies that player 0 updates the counter correctly.
However, since player 0 uses a finite-state strategy, the corresponding counter
values are bounded by a constant, a contradiction. q.e.d.
Note that FinNE is recursively enumerable: To decide whether an
SSMG (G, v0) has a finite-state Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y,
one can just enumerate all possible finite-state profiles and check for each of
them whether the profile is a Nash equilibrium with the desired properties by
analysing the finite Markov chain that is generated by this profile (where one
identifies states that correspond to the same vertex and memory state). Hence,
to show the undecidability of FinNE, we cannot reduce from the non-halting
problem but from the halting problem for two-counter machines (which is
recursively enumerable itself).
Theorem 11. FinNE is undecidable.
Proof. The construction is similar to the one for proving undecidability of
PureNE. Given a two-counter machine M, we modify the SSMG G con-
structed in the proof of Theorem 8 by adding another “counter” (together
with four more players for checking whether the counter is updated correctly)
that has to be incremented in each step. Moreover, additionally to the termi-
nal vertices in the gadgets Ctj,γ, we let player 0 win at the terminal vertex in
each of the gadgets Ii,γ where ιi = “halt”. Let us denote the new game by
G ′. Now, if M does not halt, any pure Nash equilibrium of (G ′, v0) where
player 0 wins almost surely needs infinite memory: to win almost surely,
player 0 must follow the computation ofM and increment the new counter
at each step. On the other hand, ifM halts, then we can easily construct a
finite-state Nash equilibrium of (G ′, v0) where player 0 wins almost surely.
Hence, (G ′, v0) has a finite-state Nash equilibrium where player 1 wins almost
surely iff the machineM halts. The details of the construction are left to the
reader. q.e.d.
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6 Conclusion
We have analysed the complexity of deciding whether a simple stochastic
multiplayer game has a Nash equilibrium whose payoff falls into a certain
interval. Our results demonstrate that the presence of both stochastic vertices
and more than two players makes the problem much more complicated than
when one of these factors is absent. In particular, the problem of deciding the
existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium where player 0 wins almost
surely is undecidable for simple stochastic multiplayer games, whereas it is
contained in NP∩ co-NP for two-player, zero-sum simple stochastic games
[8] and even in P for non-stochastic infinite multiplayer games with, e.g.,
Büchi winning conditions [23].
Apart from settling the complexity of NE when arbitrary mixed strategies
are considered, future research may, for example, investigate restrictions of
NE to games with a small number of players. In particular, we conjecture that
the problem is decidable for two-player games, even if these are not zero-sum.
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